Microeconomics

This course provides an introduction to the mathematical modeling of the behavior of agents seeking to optimize an individual objective in a competitive environment.

Introduce the formal framework for utility maximization for a single agent, then for two interacting agents. Derive the main optimality results and apply this framework to a competitive economic context.

Convex Optimization Course.

Recommended prerequisites: a solid understanding of differential and integral calculus, as well as solving constrained optimization problems.

1. Introduction:

  a) The Evolution of the Definition of Economics

  b) A brief overview of the history of game theory.

2. Interaction between economic agents and elements of non-cooperative game theory:

  a) Description of a game

    a.1) Simultaneous games and dynamic games

            - Representation of a game in standard form

            - Extensive representation

    a.2) Equilibrium in dominant strategies.

    a.3) Nash equilibrium

    a.4) Example of a model applied to industrial economics: Cournot and Bertrand duopolies.

  b) Dynamic games

    b.1) Refinement of the Nash equilibrium: perfect subgame equilibria and the backward induction algorithm

    b.2) Market Entry Strategies

3. Information Theory: Information Asymmetry and Incentives:

  a) Principal-agent model

    a.1) Information asymmetry: Akerlof’s “Lemons” model

    a.2) Market entry model in the presence of cost information asymmetry.

  b) Incentives and mechanisms

    b.1) Design of incentive mechanisms

    b.2) Implementation as a dominant strategy.

Hourly volumes:

            CM: 9

            TD: 9

            Practical Work: 

            Lot: