ECTS
2 credits
Training structure
Faculty of Science
Description
This course introduces mathematical modeling of the behavior of actors seeking to optimize an individual objective in a competitive situation.
Objectives
Introduce the formalism of utility maximization for one actor, then two actors interacting. Establish the main optimality results and apply this formalism to the competitive economic context.
Teaching hours
- Microeconomics - LectureLecture9 a.m.
- Microeconomics - TutorialTutorials9 a.m.
Mandatory prerequisites
Convex optimization course.
Recommended prerequisites: a good command of differential and integral calculus, as well as solving optimization problems under constraints.
Syllabus
1. Introduction:
a) Evolution of the definition of economics
b) Brief overview of the history of game theory.
2. Interaction between economic actors and elements of non-cooperative game theory:
a) Description of a game
a.1) Simultaneous games and dynamic games
- Representation of a game in normal form
- Extensive representation
a.2) Balance in dominant strategies.
a.3) Nash equilibrium
a.4) Example of model application to industrial economics: Cournot and Bertrand duopoly.
b) Dynamic games
b.1) Refinement of Nash equilibrium: perfect equilibria in subgames and backward induction algorithm
b.2) Market entry games
3. Information theory: information asymmetry and incentives:
a)Principal-agent model
a.1) Information asymmetry: Akerlof's "Lemons" model
a.2) Market entry model in the presence of asymmetric information on costs.
b) Incentives and mechanisms
b.1) Design of incentive mechanisms
b.2) Implementation as a dominant strategy.
Additional information
Hourly volumes:
CM: 9
TD: 9
TP:
Land: